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Abstract—Malicious attack detection is one of the critical
cyber-security challenges in the peer-to-peer smart grid platforms
due to the fact that attackers’ behaviours change continuously
over time. In this paper, we evaluate twelve Machine Learning
(ML) algorithms in terms of their ability to detect anomalous
behaviours over the networking practice. The evaluation is
performed on three publicly available datasets: CICIDS-2017,
UNSW-NB15 and the Industrial Control System (ICS) cyber-
attack datasets. The experimental work is performed through the
ALICE high-performance computing facility at the University of
Leicester. Based on these experiments, a comprehensive analysis
of the ML algorithms is presented. The evaluation results
verify that the Random Forest (RF) algorithm achieves the
best performance in terms of accuracy, precision, Recall, F1-
Score and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves on
all these datasets. It is worth pointing out that other algorithms
perform closely to RF and that the decision regarding which
ML algorithm to select depends on the data produced by the
application system.
Index Terms—Cyber Security, intrusion detection, anomaly
detection, machine learning, deep learning, smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection in the context of cyber-security is a
continuous challenge to our human community, where attack-
ers have the motivation, opportunity and capability to launch
their attacks, which can include botnet, brute force, Denial-
of-Service (DoS), Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS), port
scan, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection, and privilege escalation attacks.
The first Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the iden-
tification of anomalous behaviours in network systems was
proposed by Anderson [1] in 1980. Anomaly detection meth-
ods such as signature-based approaches are usually used to
monitor network activities using pre-identified cyber-security
attack indicators to specify the security threats that may affect
systems’ Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability (CIA) [2].
These systems, however, have fatal limitations when it comes
to zero-day attacks or encrypted traffic generated by attackers
[3]. In the zero-day attacks, where no vulnerability has been
previously discovered, no signature will be available to help
detect the attacks. On the other hand, it will not be possible
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for the signature-based approaches to inspect encrypted traffic
generated by the attacker if the encryption key is unknown.
It is therefore necessary to consider a defence system to
reduce the accompanying risks. This can be achieved by
predicting the anomaly behaviours of malicious attacks based
on state-of-the-art Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, which
are used to train the defence model and predict any anomalous
behaviour. It is difficult, however, to achieve a high level of
prediction accuracy while maintaining a low false alarm rate,
and this challenge remains to be solved in the literature.
Currently, with the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tech-
nologies, researchers can classify data collected from network
activities, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, SCADA systems
[4], mobile phones [5], smart grids [6] or log data from
any machine into either a binary classification of normal or
abnormal behaviours, or multi-class attack classifications of
normal or different types of abnormal behaviours associated
with specific attacks. Anomaly detection, also called outlier
detection, is the method that is used to distinguish the rare
events which look unusual from the majority of the data.
The main contributions of this paper are summarised as
follows: (1) We review the currently available datasets that
have the most the up-to-date attack scenarios. (2) We review
the current works that apply ML to the detection of anomalous
behaviours. (3) We apply twelve ML algorithms to the selected
datasets and evaluate them using binary classification and
multi-classification based on the performance metrics. (4) We
recommend the best-fit algorithms for the anomaly detection
challenge. This paper provides the research community and
the cybersecurity industry with insightful knowledge and sug-
gestions regarding suitable ML algorithms to the cybersecurity
challenge.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we review the relevant work in the area of anomaly detection
using ML. In Section III, we describe the methodology used
in our work and the structure of these methods. Section
IV provides a detailed experimental design that includes
the running environment, the dataset selected to evaluate
the methods and the experimental results for the binary
and multi-class attacks classifications. Finally, Section V
concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We first review previous works focusing on ML algorithms
and their application to the detection of anomalous behaviours
in the cybersecurity field.
A. Machine Learning
In recent years, ML algorithms have become a popular
problem-solving approach in various disciplines of science,
from computer, vision and behaviour analysis [7] to cyber-
security, e.g. anomaly detection [8]. Furthermore, the potential
use of ML in different applications looks promising [9],
although deep learning also offers promising solutions from
a different angle. Since deep learning algorithms require a
large dataset for training, however, Parampottupadam and
Moldovann [10] conclude that the performance of deep learn-
ing models may not necessarily outperform other traditional
ML models in some applications.
ML algorithms use statistical models that provide systems
with the ability to produce predictions without human inter-
vention, having accessed sample data, known as training data,
in order to learn and improve human experiences. Available
ML algorithms enable the analysis of large volumes of data,
including: supervised ML algorithms, unsupervised ML algo-
rithms, semi-supervised ML algorithms and reinforcement ML
algorithms.
In this study, we evaluate six classical supervised ML
algorithms and six deep learning algorithms. The selection
of these methods is based on the use and the performance
of the algorithms in previous studies. The selected classical
ML algorithms are Logistic Regression (LR), Gaussian Naive
Bayes (GNB), K-nearest Neighbours (KNN), Decision Tree
(DT), Adaptive boosting (AdaB), and Random Forest (RF).
Our selected deep learning algorithms include Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), Convolutional Neural Network and
Long short-Term Memory (CNN-LSTM), Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), Simple
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), and Deep Neural Network
(DNN).
B. Applications of ML Algorithms
There has been an increase in the amount of research in
recent years seeking to apply ML to the detection of anoma-
lous behaviours in the cyber-security field, either classical
ML classification and deep learning classification techniques,
or a combination of both the groups. Vinayakumar et al.
[11] proposed a highly scalable and hybrid DNNs frame-
work using KDDCup-99, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, WSN-
DS and CICIDS2017 datasets. With five DNN hidden layers,
they achieved binary classification accuracy of 92.7%, 78.9%,
76.1%, 98.2% and 93.1% respectively.
Zhang et al. [12] proposed a network intrusion detection
based on a deep hierarchical network and original flow data,
using CNN classification to learn spatial features and Long
short-term memory (LSTM) classification to learn temporal
features, for the CICIDS2017 and CTU datasets. After the
classification process by CNN+LSTM, 99.8% accuracy was
achieved for the CICIDS2017 dataset, and 98.7% accuracy
for the CTU dataset.
Al-Zewairi et al. [13] evaluated ANN on the UNSW-NB15
dataset using the back propagation and stochastic gradient
descent methods, and delivering the evaluation accuracy of
98.99% with a low false alarm rate of around 0.5%.
Beluch et al. [14] conducted performance evaluation of
intrusion detection based ML classification algorithms, i.e.
Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine (SVM), RF and Naive
Bayes, using big data technologies (Apache Spark 1) on the
full UNSW-NB15 dataset, achieving 97.49 % accuracy.
Faker et al. [15] evaluated the performance of three classi-
fication methods (DNN, RF, and GBT) using Apache Spark
on subsets of the selected features from both UNSW-NB15
and CICIDS2017 datasets. Both binary and multi-class attack
classifications were used in their study, and they concluded that
DNN has the best performance, exhibiting 99.19% accuracy
using the UNSW-NB15 dataset and 99.99% accuracy using
CICIDS2017.
This brief review of the literature shows that there are
numerous ways to integrate the use of AI with cyber-security.
Using the publicly available datasets, researchers can evaluate
and compare the performance of various ML algorithms. This
will lead to a better understanding of the topic and provide
an excellent chance to implement these technologies within
industrial systems to reduce the risk of known and unknown
attacks.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we evaluate twelve ML algorithms in terms
of their ability to detect anomalous behaviours that take place
in a host or network system to discover possible attacks
including DoS, port scanning, SQL injection, brute force,
worms and other associated vulnerabilities found in UNSW-
NB15 and CICIDS2017 datasets. Moreover, using the Indus-
trial Control Systems (ICS) cyber-attack dataset, we wish to
detect anomalous behaviours including data injection, remote
tripping command injection, and relay setting change.
In this section, we briefly describe the twelve selected ML
algorithms. The selection was based on the popularity and the
performance of these algorithms in previous studies.
There is a wide range of ML classification techniques,
which, although they share the same objectives, encompass
very different mathematical models, strengths and weaknesses.
Each technique attempts to classify data in different circum-
stances. K-nearest neighbours (KNN) [16], for example, is
a traditional non-parametric technique to classify samples.
KNN is a type of instance-based learning algorithm. This
classification method is based on a distance function that
measures the estimated distances between objects to assign all
unlabelled objects to the most common among its K nearest
neighbours, where the K value is always a positive integer
number. Naive Bayes [17] is a traditional classifier that applies
Bayes’ theorem of pre-probability to classify data instances to
1https://spark.apache.org/
TABLE I: The advantages and disadvantages of the selected machine learning algorithms.
Algorithm Advantages Disadvantages
Logistic Regression (LR) Low computing cost and fast speed. Its
output can be interpreted as a probability
May suffer from under-fitting. The perfor-
mance is poor when the feature space is
large
Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) Fast training speed for small and big
datasets. Less sensitive to missing data
It needs to calculate prior probabilities. It
does not work well if the sample’s attributes
are related
K-nearest Neighbours (KNN) It can be used for both classification and re-
gression. Easy to understand and implement
Poor performance when analysing unbal-
anced samples. High computational com-
plexity for large datasets
Decision Tree (DT) Fast prediction. Addressing highly non-
linear data
Suffere from over-fitting. More time is
needed to train the model
Adaptive Boosting (AdaB) Various algorithms can be used to build
sub-classifiers. Does not easily lead to over
fitting
The performance depends on the selected
weak classifier. Sensitive to outliers
Random Forest (RF) Robust to outliers and can handle them well.
It is comparatively less affected by noise
Longer training time since it will gener-
ate many trees. Much more computational
power and resources needed
Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN)
Handle high-dimensional data well with
shared convolution kernels
The training result easily converges to the
local minimum instead of the global mini-
mum using the gradient descent
Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM)
Gate mechanism greatly alleviates the prob-
lem of gradient disappearance and simplifies
the complexity of tuning parameters
High computing cost
Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) Gate mechanism alleviates the problem of
gradient disappearance
High computational cost
Simple Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN)
It can learn and use contextual information
explicitly in sequence prediction
The problem of gradient disappearance oc-
curs readily
Deep Neural Network (DNN) It can execute feature engineering on it own
compared with traditional ML methods
Many parameters need to be fine-tuned
a specific class. Logistic Regression [18] is another classifier,
based on a logistic regression function also called a sigmoid
function. The decision trees method [19] classifies data into
branch segments including a root node, internal nodes and
leaf nodes. Random Forests (RF) [20] classification works by
joining several decision trees together to correct over-fitting to
the training set of the decision trees. AdaBoost [21], another
classic ML classification approach, works by creating a strong
classifier from a number of weak classifiers.
On the other hand, in recent years, a number of deep
learning classification techniques have been developed. These
use multiple hidden layers between the input and output pro-
gressively to extract higher-level features from large datasets.
Deep Neural Network (DNN) can deal with a complex non-
linear relationship, and is a feed-forward network where the
direction of data is from the input layer to the output layer. An
opposite approach is followed by the Simple Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) [22] and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
[23] where data can flow in both directions. Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) [24] is a deep learning architecture
where each neuron is connected to all the other neurons at
the following layer by using smaller and simpler patterns.
This technique allows one to build more complex patterns.
Finally, Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) [25] are similar to
LSTM with a forget gate added to the memory block in the
LSTM architectures. GRU has fewer parameters than LSTM,
which leads to better performance in various tasks. Table 1
summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the selected
ML algorithm.
Two types of label classification methods are used in our
study, i.e. binary attack classification and multi-class attack
classification. The general structure of the proposed method
shown in Fig. 1 is divided into four phases as follows: The
dataset processing phases, where we select the right dataset
for the model. The dataset reprocessing phase, where data is
integrated and filtered before feature scaling or normalisation
is applied, moving then to binary or multi classification
labelling. The next phase is ML algorithm analysis, using one
of the selected algorithms to train and test the data. In the final
stage, we apply a number of performance metrics to measuring
and evaluating the performance of the used algorithm. More
details are presented and discussed in the experiment section
IV.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents the experimental design in detail,
which includes the environment used to run the discussed
methods and the general structure of the experimental design.
Also, we introduce the dataset used to evaluate the methods
and pre-processing phases. Finally, the experimental results are
presented, which includes binary and multi-class classification.
A. Experimental Design
The experiments were performed through the ALICE high-
performance computing facility at the University of Leicester2.
Each computer had 64GB RAM, two Ivy Bridge CPUs at
2.50GHz (20 cores in total) and 2 x Nvidia Tesla P100
GPU cards. Using Python-3.6.8 running on the Community
2https://www2.le.ac.uk/offices/itservices/ithelp/services/hpc
Fig. 1: General structure of the proposed method.
Enterprise Operating System3 (CentOS Linux 7). The classical
ML algorithms were implemented using Scikit-learn-0.21.3
ML library. The Deep learning algorithms were implemented
using Keras-2.3.04 neural-network library on top of Tensor-
Flow-1.9.05 to enable the use of GPU. Sigmoid and softmax
functions were also used for binary and multi-class classifi-
cation. Furthermore, Pandas6 and NumPy7 library packages
were used to manipulate and analyse the raw data.
B. Datasets and Data Pre-processing
Numerous numbers of network-based datasets are available
online for the research community to train and evaluate their
approaches to the detection of anomalous network behaviours
on their platforms. Finding the right dataset that contains
up-to-date attack scenarios such as botnet, brute force, Dos,
DDOS, port scan, CCS, SQL injection and privilege escalation,
with the right dataset properties in terms of usability format
and labelling results, is not an easy task.
We started by looking into the most widespread dataset for
IDS, called the KDD CUP 99 [26], which includes over five
million data points with twenty attack scenarios. Later on,
Tavallaee et al. [27] enhanced KDD CUP 99 by removing
redundancy records, namely NSL-KDD 2009. We believe this
dataset is outdated as the network traffics were generated in
1998, which cannot reflect the new network structures and
dynamics of attacks.
Ring et al. [28] comprehensively reviewed 34 datasets by
pointing out the characteristics of each dataset. Based on their
discussion and our assessment, CICIDS2017 [29] and UNSW-
NB15 [30] were used to evaluate the twelve ML algorithms in
our current paper. This is because these datasets contain a wide
range of current attack scenarios, which meet the real-world






TABLE II: Datasts Propertties
Records DatasetUNSW-NB15 CICIDS-2017 ICS cyber-attack











Features 49 78 128
Duration 31 Hours 5 Days 37 scenarios
the power system ICS cyber-attack dataset [31] was also used
since it reflects the categories of the attacks in power system
platforms. However, opposite to the previous two datasets,
it is noticed that the percentage of the attack instances are
higher than that of normal behaviour instances. Because the
power system dataset has just eight natural event scenarios
compared to twenty-eight attack events scenarios. Finally, the
three selected datasets have different properties such as event
types, attack labels names, features collected, duration and
scenarios, which are summarised in Table II.
Data cleaning techniques was performed through four main
stages:
1) Convert and integrate all the files from the same dataset
to one single CSV file.
2) Delete any infinite, none, and symbol values.
3) Feature scaling by normalising all the features.
4) The final step depended on the label classification types
that we used; namely binary classification used label
normalisation and multi-class classification used label
scaling.
C. Performance Metrics
Seven evaluation matrices are used to measure the perfor-
mance of the selected ML algorithms, i.e. accuracy, precision,
True Positive Rate (TPR), also known as Recall, False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR), F1-Score, Receiver Operating Characteristic



























Accuracy refer to the percentage of the total number of
correct classifications, while Precision refers to the closeness
of the measurements to each other. Recall measures the
percentage of actual positives which are classified as attacks.
FPR measures the percentage of normal traffic flagged as
attacks to normal connection data. The F1-score is a measure
of the test accuracy. The Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC)
summarises the size of the area under the ROC curve, which
is the trade-off between the TPR and FPR using a different
probability threshold. If the accuracy, precision, recall, F1-
score and AUC are higher, the machine learning model is
better. On the contrary, if the FPR is lower, the model is better.
On the other hand, True Positive (TP) refers to the per-
centage of attack traffic correctly classified as attack data.
False Negative (FN) refers to the percentage of attack traffic
incorrectly classified as normal data. False Positive (FP) refers
to the percentage of the normal traffic incorrectly classified as
attack data. True Negative (TN) refers to the percentage of the
normal traffic correctly classified as normal data.
Confusion Matrix is used to evaluate the performance based
on the capability of classifying network traffic into a correct
attack type. A confusion matrix allows the visualisation of the
agreement between the true label and the prediction label.
D. Experimental Results
Twelve ML algorithms are applied in this phase, six of
them using the classical ML algorithms and the rest using
deep learning algorithms. These, have been introduced in the
previous sections. The three datasets were separated so that
70% of the data is used as a training dataset, used to train
the ML models. The remaining 30% of the data form the test
dataset, which is used to evaluate the trained ML models [32].
Split the dataset to 70:30 ratio proves a better result than the
other tested ratios in our cases. Two classifications were used
to evaluate the datasets. First, the binary classification where
the label has just two outcomes, normal or attack; second,
the multi-class classification labels have a range of values that
may be assigned based on attacks types.
TABLE III: Binary Classification
Methods Accuracy Precision Recall F-score
UNSW-NB15
LR 0.753 0.858 0.735 0.792
GNB 0.716 0.693 0.997 0.818
KNN 0.829 0.851 0.887 0.869
DT 0.885 0.914 0.906 0.910
AdaB 0.839 0.817 0.965 0.884
RF 0.877 0.844 0.991 0.912
CNN 0.856 0.825 0.983 0.897
CNN-LSTM 0.835 0.804 0.980 0.889
LSTM 0.767 0.893 0.721 0.798
GRU 0.777 0.857 0.782 0.818
SimpleRNN 0.807 0.775 0.984 0.867
DNN 0.827 0.793 0.987 0.879
CICIDS-2017
LR 0.883 0.737 0.634 0.682
GNB 0.550 0.298 0.946 0.453
KNN 0.996 0.987 0.994 0.990
DT 0.998 0.995 0.996 0.996
AdaB 0.962 0.898 0.910 0.904
RF 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.997
CNN 0.996 0.991 0.989 0.990
CNN-LSTM 0.993 0.989 0.992 0.991
LSTM 0.994 0.967 0.961 0.964
GRU 0.994 0.981 0.989 0.989
SimpleRNN 0.983 0.965 0.951 0.958
DNN 0.991 0.976 0.987 0.981
ICS cyber-attack datasets
LR 0.710 0.710 1.000 0.830
GNB 0.709 0.710 0.999 0.830
KNN 0.849 0.882 0.909 0.895
DT 0.864 0.905 0.903 0.904
AdaB 0.720 0.732 0.956 0.829
RF 0.928 0.929 0.972 0.950
CNN 0.715 0.715 0.999 0.834
CNN-LSTM 0.715 0.715 1.000 0.833
LSTM 0.715 0.715 1.000 0.833
GRU 0.715 0.715 1.000 0.834
SimpleRNN 0.715 0.715 0.999 0.834
DNN 0.716 0.716 1.000 0.834
1) Binary Classification, the prediction accuracy for
UNSW-NB15 dataset reached 88.5% using the Decision
tree algorithm, while the other algorithms are in the
range of 71% to 87.7%. Meanwhile, the accuracy for
the CICIDS-2017 dataset reaches 99.9% using the RF
algorithm, whereas the other algorithms are in the
range of 55% to 99.8%. On the other hand, when
using the ICS cyber-attack datasets, RF achieves the
best result, with the accuracy of 92.8%, whereas other
algorithms are in the range of 70% to 86%. Both the
RF and Decision tree accuracy results with respect to
binary classification are better than the other methods
for all the datasets. This indicates that the DT and RF
classifiers are relatively generalisable and can detect
new attacks effectively. In addition, it is obvious that
the performance of deep learning algorithms including
CNN, CNN-LSTM, LSTM, GRU, SimpleRNN and
DNN in ICS cyber-attack datasets is worse than that
of KNN, DT and RF. The main reason is that this
dataset is small, and robust deep learning models need
to be fed with a great number of data for training.
The detailed results of the binary classification for
all the evaluation methods are shown in Table III,
encompassing accuracy, precision, recall and f-score.
2) Multi-class Classification, the prediction accuracy for
UNSW-NB15 dataset reaches 73.6% using the RF al-
gorithm, while the other algorithms are in the range
of 8.5% to 73.5%. Meanwhile, the accuracy for the
CICIDS-2017 dataset reaches 99.9% using the RF al-
gorithm, whereas the other algorithms are in the range
of 43% to 99.8%. On the other hand, when using the
ICS cyber-attack datasets, the DT algorithm reaches
92.4% accuracy, whereas the other algorithms are in the
range of 6% to 92%. Similarly, both the RF and DT
accuracy results in respect to multi-class classification
are better than that of the other methods for all the
datasets. Especially in the ICS cyber-attack dataset, the
performance of the two classifiers is clearly superior
to that of deep learning and other classical machine
learning algorithms. The detailed result of the multi-
class classification for all the evaluation methods are
shown in Table IV, encompassing accuracy, precision,
recall and f-score .
E. Discussion
To discuss the results further, we create ROC curves for the
UNSW NB-15, CICIDS-2017 and ICS cyber-attack datasets.
These are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. Sometimes the differences
in the results are marginal, but using the AUC metric, we
observe that RF has the best performance result of all the
algorithms, ranging from 0.96 to 1 for the binary classification,
and from 0.97 to 1 for multi-classification. This indicates that
RF achieves the lowest FPR and the highest TPR.
The primary concept behind RF is that it combines a single
network of the companion of multi decision trees into a
single model. With a large dataset, however, the training time
will be very long since it generates many trees that require
high computational power and resources. We see that RF
outperforms all the evaluated deep learning algorithms in our
case, because deep learning algorithms require a larger dataset
than that which we use to generate better performance.
On the other hand, Gaussian Naive Bayes has the worst
performance of all the tested algorithms, ranging from 0.51
to 0.84 for the binary classification, from 0.54 to 0.86 for
multi-classification. In comparison to all the other algorithms,
therefore, Naive Bayes achieves the lowest TPR and the
highest FPR.
The fact that Gaussian Naive Baies exhibits the worst
evaluation performance is not surprising, since it depends
heavily on the independence between the input variables, and
performance is known to be affected if the sample’s attributes
are related.
Also, we notice from Figs. 2 (a,c) and 3 (a,e) that integrating
CNN, which connects a neuron to all the other neurons at the
next layer, with LSTM, where data flows in both directions,
does not always serve to improve the performance. We may
TABLE IV: Multi-class Classification
Methods Accuracy Precision Recall F-score
UNSW-NB15
LR 0.561 0.497 0.561 0.428
GNB 0.085 0.587 0.085 0.130
KNN 0.652 0.638 0.652 0.638
DT 0.735 0.715 0.735 0.718
AdaB 0.631 0.553 0.631 0.557
RF 0.736 0.726 0.736 0.695
CNN 0.684 0.672 0.684 0.627
CNN-LSTM 0.680 0.619 0.680 0.615
LSTM 0.661 0.601 0.661 0.598
GRU 0.665 0.600 0.661 0.608
SimpleRNN 0.662 0.585 0.662 0.587
DNN 0.663 0.664 0.663 0.608
CICIDS-2017
LR 0.915 0.914 0.915 0.910
GNB 0.430 0.846 0.430 0.522
KNN 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996
DT 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
AdaB 0.818 0.769 0.818 0.760
RF 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
CNN 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.996
CNN-LSTM 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.994
LSTM 0.991 0.990 0.991 0.989
GRU 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.991
SimpleRNN 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.993
DNN 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
ICS cyber-attack datasets
LR 0.068 0.036 0.068 0.017
GNB 0.107 0.164 0.107 0.062
KNN 0.877 0.878 0.877 0.877
DT 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924
AdaB 0.185 0.070 0.185 0.090
RF 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920
CNN 0.061 0.004 0.061 0.007
CNN-LSTM 0.061 0.004 0.062 0.007
LSTM 0.369 0.307 0.369 0.319
GRU 0.321 0.240 0.321 0.262
SimpleRNN 0.244 0.189 0.244 0.198
DNN 0.379 0.332 0.379 0.308
make the model more sophisticated and in particular, enhance
the network bone itself.
A multi-classification confusion matrix is used for further
investigation into the RF results as shown in Figure 4, where
the result shows that RF archives satisfactory prediction results
close to the true label for the CICIDS-2017 dataset. The
accuracy of detecting Infiltration is much lower than that of
other categories because the number of this type of attack is
relatively small. Thus it is difficult for the generated model
to learn robust feature representation of this attack. However,
using UNSW-NB15 dataset, the matrix as shown in Figure 5
shows a mixed result, where, RF has some very low agreement
to detect attacks e.g. Back-doors, DoS, and exploitaion.
Finally, the overall performance of ML algorithms using
the general-purpose network datasets (UNSW NB-15 and
CICIDS-2017) seems better than that of the ICS cyber-attack
dataset. This is because the structure of the general-purpose
network’s datasets are less complicated than the ICS cyber-
attack dataset, also, the ICS cyber-attack dataset has 37
scenarios compared with two to nine attack scenarios on the
other two datasets.
(a) Deep Learning – UNSW (b) Classic ML – UNSW
(c) Deep Learning – CICIDS (d) Classic ML- CICIDS
(e) Deep Learning – ICS (f) Classic ML- ICS
Fig. 2: Binary Classification ROC Curves
(a) Deep Learning – UNSW (b) Classic ML – UNSW
(c) Deep Learning – CICIDS (d) Classic ML- CICIDS
(e) Deep Learning – ICS (f) Classic ML- ICS
Fig. 3: Multi Classification ROC Curves
Fig. 4: RF Confusion Matrix Result for CICIDS-2017 Dataset.
Fig. 5: RF Confusion Matrix Result for UNSW-NB15 Dataset.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have comprehensively evaluated the per-
formance of the twelve ML algorithms for the detection
of anomalous behaviours that may be indicative of cyber
attacks. In order to recommend the best-fit algorithms, three
datasets (i.e. UNSW-NB15, CICIDS-2017, and ICS cyber-
attack) were applied to the selected methods. Results in most
of the cases show that the RF classification provides the best
accuracy, precision, recall and AUC among the methods used
in this paper. This may be due to the fact that deep learning
classification requires a very large amount of data to train
the models and this is not available in the current studies.
Meanwhile, as discussed in the previous section, Naive Bayes
classification has the lowest performance in terms of accuracy,
precision, recall and AUC.
It is evident, however, that the selection of the most ap-
propriate method will depend on the datasets used. We also
observe that, in many cases, the differences in the performance
table are marginal.
Our future work is to evaluate these methods on the smart
grid dataset that we are creating using the same environment.
Also, the training and testing time of the selected method
will be measured to identify the best performance in terms
of efficiency.
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